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Abstract
This paper reports the results from a large-scale laboratory experiment investigating the
impact of tournament incentives and wage gifts on creativity. We find that tournaments
substantially increase creative output, with no evidence for crowding out of intrinsic
motivation. By comparison, wage gifts are ineffective. Additional treatments show that it is
the uncertain mapping between effort and output that inhibits reciprocity. This uncertainty
is prevalent in creative and other complex tasks. Our findings provide a rationale for the
frequent use of tournaments when seeking to motivate creative output.
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1 Introduction
The share of workers performing tasks that require them to engage in non-routine problem
solving and creative thinking has increased substantially over the last several decades (Autor
et al., 2003; Florida, 2002). This trend requires firms to adapt and change in many ways.
One particular challenge relates to incentivizing workers to perform well in these types of
jobs. To date little is known about how creative performance responds to incentives.1 By
comparison, there is a long tradition in economics that investigates the impact of work incentives
on motivation and productivity in simple and routine tasks. The purpose of this paper is to gain a
deeper understanding of the incentive response function of creativity by investigating the extent
to which lessons learned from simple tasks can be generalized to creative tasks.
Dozens of studies have explored the impact of financial incentives on routine tasks, confirming
what standard economic theory predicts: financial incentives have a positive effect on
performance because agents increase effort as long as the benefits they derive from each
additional unit of output exceed their effort costs. Positive incentive effects have been
demonstrated for different types of performance-dependent rewards such as piece rates, where
workers are rewarded according to their absolute output (for instance, Lazear, 2000) or
tournaments, where workers are rewarded on the basis of their relative performance (Harbring
and Irlenbusch, 2003).2 But even as early as 1999, Prendergast noted that these types of routine
jobs are not very common.
Explicit financial incentives are, of course, not the only way to trigger workers’ performance.
An established literature on gift exchange suggests that workers reciprocate wage gifts with
higher effort (Akerlof, 1982). This hypothesis has been tested and confirmed in a myriad of
laboratory experiments with both chosen and real effort (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 1997 for an early
study on the topic, or Fehr and Gächter, 2000 for an overview). There is, however, mixed
evidence on the effectiveness of gift-exchange in the field (see, for example, Gneezy and List,
2006). Like the literature on financial incentives, these studies have also almost exclusively
utilized simple, routine tasks.
Taken together, these findings inform human resource management on how to optimally reward
employees in jobs that involve a clearly defined and repetitive workflow. Yet it is critical
to understand whether these insights into the effectiveness of different rewards also hold for
1The nascent literature on incentivizing creativity in economics will be discussed below.
2In the field, researchers observed work performance when, for instance, installing wind shields (Lazear, 2000),
picking fruits (Bandiera et al., 2005), or planting trees (Shearer, 2004); in the laboratory, subjects have been
rewarded for typing letters (Dickinson, 1999), cracking walnuts (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000), or filling envelopes
(Falk and Ichino, 2006). A main advantage of these tasks is that they offer a precise and easily observable measure
of the quantity (and the quality) of workers’ output.
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jobs which rely on creativity.3 To date, economic theory mostly abstracts from the nature of
the task and predicts uniform effects of rewards across different tasks. One exception is the
literature on motivational crowding out that suggests that explicit incentives can sometimes be
counterproductive. This is especially likely for tasks which are cognitively complex or high in
intrinsic motivation, both of which are attributes of creative tasks (Bonner et al., 2000; Camerer
and Hogarth, 1999; Amabile, 1996; Shalley et al., 2004). The idea is that the provision of
financial incentives can “crowd out” the intrinsic motivation to perform the task (Deci et al.,
1999).4 So far, the economic literature on crowding out has primarily focused on intrinsically
motivated activities that are not creativity-oriented (e.g., Frey and Jegen, 2001, or Gneezy
et al., 2011 for overviews) and still debates the existence of crowding out effects (e.g., Fang
and Gerhart, 2012; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Charness and Gneezy, 2009). Gifts might be effective
in situations where crowding out effects can be expected to be strong, for instance for creative
work, yet there is no previous literature exploring this hypothesis.
This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment with more than 1000 subjects that
addresses these open issues. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of five, with one
principal (“employer”) and four agents (“employees”). The four agents worked for three periods
for their principal on either a creative or a routine task. Our basic design is 2 x 3: the routine and
the creative task with three treatments (control, gift, tournament) each. We also ran a host of
supplementary treatments that serve to elucidate the underlying mechanisms. In all treatments,
the principal’s payoff depended on the output produced by their four agents, who received an
exogenously assigned fixed wage in each period. After agents worked on the task for one
period, principals could decide whether or not to provide additional rewards to their agents
(at their own expense and without knowledge about agents’ performance in Period 1). In the
Tournament treatment, the principal could provide an additional monetary prize to the 50% best
performing agents in her group. In the Gift treatment, the principal could opt for a monetary
gift, half as large as the tournament prize, to all four agents in her group. In the third period,
subjects were asked to work for the principal for one more round without additional rewards.
The experiment was run as a three period design to provide us 1) with a baseline measure
of performance (capturing agents’ ability, intrinsic motivation to perform the task, and
3According to the dominant scholarly definition, creativity is defined as the production of ideas, solutions,
or products that are novel (i.e., original) and appropriate (i.e., useful) in a given situation (Amabile, 1997). In
contrast, a task can be defined as routine “if it can be accomplished by machines following explicit programmed
rules.” (Autor et al., 2003, p. 1283). The addition of “simple” refines this latter definition by restricting the set of
tasks to those that are simple to understand and perform, i.e., that do not require much instruction, skill, or prior
knowledge.
4According to self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), a reward causes a shift in people’s perception of why they
perform a task: own behavior is attributed to the reward and not to the enjoyment of the activity itself. As
a result, if a reward is subsequently removed, individuals are less motivated to work on the task (Deci, 1971;
Lepper et al., 1973; Amabile, 1988, 1996; Joussemet and Koestner, 1999; Deci et al., 1999, among others). Other
reasons for a negative effect of rewards on performance include the exertion of “too much effort” or an increase in
self-consciousness beyond an optimal level (e.g., Camerer and Hogarth, 1999 or Ariely et al., 2009).
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other-regarding preferences towards the principal), 2) with a measure of performance under
both types of rewards schemes for both tasks,5 and 3) with a measure of whether or not
treatments affected intrinsic motivation (which can only be captured in a subsequent period
without rewards). Both reward schemes were designed to have identical costs to the principal
and overall benefits to the group of workers; they differed only in the distribution of benefits
among workers. tThis feature allows conclusions about which of the two schemes is preferable
given a fixed budget for rewards.
In addition to the two monetary reward treatments, we ran a control group for each task which
allows us to account for learning and fatigue and to standardize performance across the two
tasks, rendering the effect sizes comparable.
We find a substantial and positive incentive effect of the Tournament in both tasks (routine
and creative) in the second period. The effect sizes are of similar magnitude in the two
tasks, suggesting that performance in both tasks is equally sensitive to competitive incentives.
Subsequent to learning whether they were winners or losers at the end of Period 2, winners in
the Tournament outperformed comparable others in the control group in Period 3 even though
there was no subsequent tournament prize at stake. Losers, on the other hand, returned to
their baseline level of performance. This is evidence against the notion that financial rewards
crowd out intrinsic motivation and thus creative performance. To the contrary, it suggests
that performance-dependent rewards in the form of tournament incentives increase creative
performance and even have long-lasting effects on tournament winners.
Interestingly, the performance response to the wage gift differs between the two tasks. Subjects
in the routine task respond to the gift with an economically and statistically significant increase
in their performance. The effect size is similar to that typically found in the literature on gift
exchange (see, for instance, Fehr and Gächter, 2002). However, agents do not reciprocate the
gift in the creative task. We discuss various potential explanations for this asymmetry and show
that the absence of reciprocity in the creative task is driven by employees’ lack of ability to
finetune their back transfer to the principal. Creative tasks are characterized by this inability
since the exact value of an idea is typically somewhat uncertain and only becomes apparent
with time, say, after an idea is implemented. The same was true in our experiment where the
value of an idea to the principal depended on the originality rating of an idea. Overall our results
suggest that creative tasks respond well to performance incentives and that responses to rewards
are very similar in creative and routine tasks; however, certain features inherent in creative work
affect the effectiveness of gifts as rewards. Therefore, wage gifts for employees in creative tasks
might not effectively boost creativity in practice.
5We use the term reward for both the tournament reward scheme as well as the wage gift as a shorthand, even
though the wage gift is not a reward as it is commonly understood, i.e. rewarding past performance. Instead it
is independent of both past and future performance. Fehr and Falk (2002), for example, have therefore described
wage gifts as implicit rewards.
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This study contributes to the small but growing literature in economics that studies the impact
of rewards on creativity. Previous studies have explored how creativity is influenced by the size
of the reward (Ariely et al., 2009) or the type of creative task (Charness and Grieco, 2012).
Laske and Schroeder (2015) focus on the multi-tasking aspect of creativity by looking at how
incentives affect quantity, quality, and novelty of creative output. Erat and Gneezy (2015), by
comparison, compare the effectiveness of piece rate incentives and competitive incentives and
find evidence for choking under pressure.6
We extend this nascent economic literature on creativity as well as the literature on incentive
provision in five distinct ways. First, to our knowledge this is the first study to examine the
effectiveness of financial gifts for increasing creative performance. The lack of literature on
this subject is surprising given both the attention that gift exchange has received in the literature
in the context of incomplete contracts (see Fehr and Gächter, 2000 for an overview) and the fact
that creative jobs seem to be a prime example of jobs that are complex, hard to monitor, and
typically governed by incomplete contracts. Second, as far as we know, this is also the first study
to compare the effect sizes of a performance-dependent, competitive incentive (tournament)
with that of a performance-independent wage gift in one set-up. By doing so, our design allows
a direct comparison of the cost-effectiveness of the two reward schemes.7 Such a comparison is
especially relevant for creativity as theory suggests that these two types of rewards might affect
it in fundamentally different ways (e.g., Byron and Khazanchi, 2012). Third, we look into
whether the incentive-response function differs between our creative and our simple, routine
tasks. This comparison provides first insights into whether the lessons learned with simple tasks
generalize to creative tasks, and, hence, whether an independent literature assessing incentives
for creativity is needed. Fourth, we introduce the Unusual Uses task into the experimental
literature on creativity. In our view, this task captures central elements of day-to-day creativity
in organizations well (Woodman et al., 1993).8 In the task, subjects have to come up with
as many and as original alternative uses for common objects such as a tin can or a sheet of
paper. Hence, rather than measuring blue-sky creativity – even though Unusual Uses does
allow measuring the originality of ideas as well – the task focuses on whether subjects can
place common objects into a different context. This is a central element in business innovation
6Another study in this realm is Eckartz et al. (2012). They implemented a creative task as well as two control
tasks for comparison (Raven’s IQ and a number-adding task) in one experimental set-up. They find that neither the
tournament incentive nor a piece rate had any effect on performance in any of the three tasks. This makes it hard
to draw clear conclusions about whether or not rewards fail to enhance creativity, since their rewards did not affect
their control groups either. A likely explanation is that baseline motivation was very high in all three tasks.
7We used a tournament scheme rather than a piece rate as the performance-dependent reward scheme because
tournaments are widely used in practice to reward individuals for creative performance and innovations (Brunt
et al., 2012; Kremer and Williams, 2010). For instance, companies increasingly allocate creative tasks to online
platforms with creative contests (such as www.innocentive.com or www.jovoto.com) to complement their in-house
research and development. These platforms offer tournament-based compensation for various creative tasks such
as scientific problem-solving, software development, and graphic art design (Boudreau et al., 2011).
8The task has also been used by Dutcher (2012) in his study on the effects of telecommuniting on productivity.
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and in corporate idea-suggestion systems. In that sense, the paper complements the existing
literature that mostly focuses on blue-sky creativity or on tasks that involve very little creativity
such as those that involve pattern recognition. An advantage of the task is that it measures
and captures creativity along several different dimensions: quantity (the number of answers),
breadth (the spread of answers across different idea categories), as well as originality (measured
as either the statistical infrequency of answers or by subjective evaluation). The availability of
these separate measures allows us to address issues such as quantity - quality tradeoffs when
assessing the effect of incentives on creative performance. Finally, we provide another data
point to the discussion on whether or not it is possible to foster creative performance through
financial rewards.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental set-up, the tasks, and
the treatments. Section 3 presents our main results, Section 4 investigates mechanisms and
looks into a number of supplementary issues, for instance, the absence of reciprocity in the
creative task, the mechanism via which tournaments increase effort, and post-treatment effects.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Experiment
In the following, we introduce the experimental tasks, the set up, the treatments, and the
experimental procedures.
2.1 The Tasks
In order to assess the effectiveness of rewards for routine and creative tasks, we implemented
both types of tasks in the experiment.
We use the “slider task” as a proxy for simple, routine tasks in the workplace (Gill and Prowse,
2012). The slider task is a real effort task that has a number of desirable attributes. It is easy
to explain and to understand, and it does not require prior knowledge. It is identical across
repetitions, involves little randomness, and leaves no scope for guessing. The task features a
computer screen displaying 48 sliders on scales that range from 0 to 100. Figure 1 shows an
example of the screen as it was presented in the experiment.
Initially, all sliders are positioned at zero. The aim of the task is to position as many sliders as
possible at exactly 50 within 3 minutes by using the mouse.9 Each slider can be adjusted and
re-adjusted an unlimited number of times. While moving the mouse, subjects cannot be sure
whether they positioned the slider at exactly 50. The exact position of the slider is displayed
9Keyboards were disconnected during the task to prevent the usage of the arrow keys.
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to the right of the scale only when the subject stops using the mouse. We measure a subject’s
performance as the number of correctly positioned sliders within the alotted time. Gill and
Prowse demonstrated that this measure corresponds closely to the effort exerted by a subject.
Before the start of Period 1, subjects were given one minute to practice the task.
We measure creative performance via the “Unusual Uses Task.” Originally developed as
Guilford’s Alternative Uses Task (Guilford, 1967), it was later incorporated in the Torrance
Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1968, 1998), the most widely used and validated test to
assess creativity (Kim, 2006).10 In the Unusual Uses Task, participants are asked to name
as many, unique and unusual uses for an ordinary item, such as a tin can, as they can. This
captures a central element in applied business innovations: the recombination of existing bits
of knowledge in novel ways (Weitzman, 1998; Simonton, 2004). Specifically, the task requires
divergent thinking or “thinking outside the box,” which is one of the most important components
of the creative process (Runco, 1991). One advantage of the Unusal Uses task is that it provides
a clean numerical measure of creative productivity.
In the experiment, subjects had to sequentially brainstorm unusual uses for three different items:
a sheet of paper, a tin can, and a cord. Subjects were informed that they should not limit
themselves to a particular size of the item. Moreover, the unusual use that they come up with
could require more than one of the items; for instance, the use could require more than one
sheet of paper or several tin cans. The order in which subjects had to work on the items was
fixed: (1) paper, (2) tin can, (3) cord.11
In the creative task, just as in the slider task, subjects had a test period of one minute. In this
test period, subjects were given the item “old tire” to familiarize themselves with the task and
the input mask on the screen. We used the three standard measures of the Unusual Uses task to
evaluate subjects’ responses: fluency, flexibility, and originality (Guilford, 1959), and we told
subjects how their answers would be scored.12 Fluency refers to the number of valid answers.
An answer is valid if the stated use is possible to implement and the realization is at least vaguely
conceivable. Fantastic or impossible uses are not counted. Examples of a valid use of a tin can
are, for instance, a flower pot, a pen container, and a drum. In contrast, examples of invalid
answers are the use of a tin can as a television, a computer, or a window.13 In the experiment,
10In order to assess overall creative potential, the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking also includes a number of
figural elements that require drawing skills. The more specific Unusual Uses task, however, best captures the type
of creativity that we want to study.
11Controlling for order effects is not important in our design as we use the same order in the control group and
only look at changes in performance between periods and between treatment and control groups.
12The original Guilford Test uses a fourth criterion for scoring, elaboration, which refers to the degree of detail
of the answers. We refrained from using this fourth dimension because it is largely effort-based and would have
constrained our capacity to score answers within the time frame of the experiment.
13Usual uses, such as a food container in the case of the tin can, were not scored in the original version
of Guilford’s Alternative Uses Task or the TTCT. However, the original instructions of the test (as well as our
instructions) do not explicitly exclude usual uses from scoring. We therefore scored usual uses as valid answers.
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each valid use was given one point.
The second evaluation measure, flexibility, reflects the variety of a subject’s responses and
is determined by counting the number of different categories into which responses fall. For
instance, the answer candleholder falls into the category ‘decoration’, and answers like a rattle
or a drum into the category ‘musical instruments.’ Subjects received one point for each category.
Common categories for the tin can include ‘non-food containers’ (for instance, a pen container),
‘sporting goods’ (for instance, a football), and ‘communication’ (for instance, a tin can phone).
Overall, there were roughly 55 categories for each of the three items that we used.
Finally, the originality of responses was measured by the statistical infrequency of answers. In
order to get an idea of the frequency of responses, we conducted a pre-test with 127 participants
who worked on the three items under a fixed wage scheme. We then tabulated all valid answers
for each item according to the frequency with which the answer was given and constructed a
rating scale to assess answers in the experiment. This scale allotted one additional point to
a valid answer if less than 8% (“original”) and two additional points if less than 1% (“very
original”) of participants gave that answer. In comparison to other measures of creativity that
rely on expert ratings, our statistical approach to originality is more reliable and objective.14
Examples for an original use of a tin can are an insect trap or an animal house. Very original
answers include using the tin can as a scarecrow, a shower head, a treasure chest, or a grill (by
putting coal into it and meat on top). Table 1 illustrates further examples of frequent answers
and categories as well as original, very original, and invalid responses for all items.
Scoring was conducted by research assistants who were carefully acquainted with the scoring
procedures and blind to the treatments. In order to test whether the creative task is more
intrinsically motivating than the routine task, we had 100 subjects work on both tasks and
rate their interest in the tasks on Likert-scales from 1 to 7. According to this assessment,
the creative task was rated as statistically significantly more interesting than the routine task
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.02).
2.2 Basic Set up
The experiment uses a principal-agent set up, where subjects are randomly assigned to the role
of a principal (“employer”) or an agent (“employee”). This feature is important for reciprocity
considerations as it allows 1) for voluntary financial transfers from the principal to the agent, and
Excluding usual uses, however, does not alter any of the results reported below (results available upon request).
14The answers gathered during the experiment itself allowed us to update the rating scale to more accurately
reflect overall statistical infrequency. The rating scale used for analyzing our results is based on more than
700 subjects (pre-test subjects as well as subjects in all main treatments including the supplementary Feedback
treatment.) The results do not depend on whether or not we use an updated or the original, pre-test rating scale.
Finally, our results are robust to using an expert panel for grading originality rather than the statistical approach
(details below).
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2) agents’ effort to affect the principal’s payoff, which gives agents a clear way of reciprocating
if they wish to do so. At the start of the experiment, subjects were assigned to groups of five
participants, each consisting of one principal and four agents. The role and group assignment
remained fixed throughout the experiment.
All sessions were identical in their basic structure: employees were asked to work for the
principal for three 3-minute periods on either the routine or the creative task. In each period,
employees received a fixed wage that was exogenously set by the experimenter and announced
at the start of the respective period. In the two reward treatments, principals could opt for or
against a financial gift or a tournament before the start of Period 2 (details below). In the Gift
treatment, Period 2 endowments were augmented by the amount of the gift when the principal
opted for the gifts. In the Tournament treatment, agents could receive a tournament prize at the
end of Period 2 if the principal opted for the tournament scheme and if their performance was
above average. In all treatments, Period 3 was identical to Period 1 in that endowments were
fixed and there were no additional rewards or tournaments. The three-period design allows us to
measure agents’ baseline performance under a fixed wage in Period 1, the performance response
to the reward in Period 2 and post-treatment performance under a fixed wage in Period 3.15
Period 3 is important as detrimental effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation cannot necessarily
be detected when rewards are present as the increase in monetary incentives might outweigh
the reduction in intrinsic motivation. After the three working periods, agents completed a
couple of brief decision tasks; questions about their socio-demographic characteristics such as
gender, field of study, level of education, high school grade and leisure activities; and questions
regarding their personality traits.
Employers’ payoffs consisted of a fixed pay component and a variable pay component that
was determined by the performance of the four agents in their group. All payoffs during
the experiment were stated in “Taler,” the experimental currency unit.16 In the routine task,
principals received 5 Taler for each slider that was correctly positioned by their four agents.
In the creative task, principals received 5 Taler for each validity point (valid answer), 5 Taler
for each flexibility point (category mentioned), and 5 Taler for each originality point (5 Taler
per original answer and 10 Taler per very original answer) given by their four agents. Agents
learned about the scoring procedures and the principals’ payoff function in the instructions.
In order to create an environment that carried an opportunity cost of working, we offered agents
a time-out button (Mohnen et al., 2008) which was displayed at the bottom of the screen during
all working periods. Each time an agent clicked the time-out button, the computer screen
was locked for 20 seconds, prohibiting the entry of creative ideas or the movement of sliders,
15As agents work for a fixed wage in Period 1, their effort does not affect their own payoff. It does, however,
affect the payoff of their principal. Therefore, baseline performance in Period 1 provides us with a joint measure
of intrinsic motivation for the task, their altruism towards the principal, and a subject’s ability.
16 The exchange rate was 100 Taler = 1 Euro.
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and 5 Taler were added to the agent’s payoff. This procedure has been used in a variety of
experiments to ensure that experimental subjects do not merely work on the experimental tasks
out of boredom due to the absence of alternative activities (Eckartz et al., 2012; Mohnen et al.,
2008).17
2.3 Design and Implementation of Treatments
In order to address our research questions, we implemented a 2 x 3 design consisting of a
Control group, a Tournament treatment, and a Gift treatment for both the routine and the creative
task.
In the Control group, agents were paid a fixed wage in each period and principals were not able
to implement rewards. In the Tournament and the Gift treatments, principals and agents were
informed at the end of period 1 that the principal could invest in a reward scheme for period 2.
Regardless of whether the principal decided to implement the reward scheme, agents received
information on the type of the reward (tournament or gift, depending on the treatment) and on
the associated costs to the principal. Before the start of Period 2, agents learned whether their
principal had instituted the reward. Subjects were also told that principals did not receive any
information about their agents’ performance until the very end of the experiment. This ensured
that agents perceived the wage gift as “kind,” rather than as compensation for good performance
in Period 1. Moreover, it avoided an endogenous selection of rewarded agents based on Period
1 performance.
In both treatment groups, principals and agents received a fixed wage of 300 Taler at the
beginning of each period. The same is true for the Control group with the exception of Period
2 in which the fixed payment was doubled to mirror (expected) payoffs in the treatment groups
(see below). In the Gift treatment, the principal had to decide whether or not to provide an
additional monetary gift of 300 Taler to each of her four agents at a total cost of 200 Taler to
herself.18 In the Tournament treatment, the principal could also transfer a total of 1200 Taler to
her four agents at a cost of 200 Taler to herself. However, the payment structure was different.
17 Subjects could push the time-out button as long as the remaining time in the working period was at least 20
seconds. In order to ensure that subjects were aware of the time-out button and understood its usage, we had a trial
period that lasted 60 seconds in which subjects could test the time-out button.
While the time-out button prevents any “production” in the simple, routine task, we cannot rule out that subjects
in the creative tasks continued thinking about the problem during the time that their screen was locked. This does
not mean, however, that subjects in the creative task did not face any opportunity costs of time. The timeout button
may still hinder production since it precludes a critical task – entering ideas. Overall, the use of the time-out button
was limited, suggesting that research subjects felt their time was better spent completing the assigned task.
18The use of efficiency factors is common practice in the experimental literature on gift exchange (see, for
instance, Brandts and Charness, 2004) and is thought of as representing situations in which gifts are more valuable
to the recipient than to the donor. The attractiveness of the reward was important in our setting because we were
mainly interested in agents’ responses to rewards rather than in whether or not principals opted for the rewards.
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Agents’ performance dictated whether or not they received a reward. Specifically, the top 50%
of performers (two out of four agents) received a bonus of 600 Taler each in Period 2, whereas
the bottom 50% received nothing.
When learning about the principal’s reward decision, employees also learned that performance
would be evaluated immediately after Period 2 ended, and that the winners and losers of
the Tournament would be revealed before Period 3 started. Finally, after Period 2 and after
the revelation of winners and losers (presented as private information on a subject’s screen),
subjects in both treatments were informed that there would be no further rewards. In all
treatments (including the control group) it was further announced that the payment structure
in Period 3 would be identical to that in Period 1.
This study focuses on agents’ responses to rewards, rather than on principals’ reward decisions.
Therefore, the rewards were relatively cheap for the principal, and endowments in the control
group mirrored (expected) payments in the two treatment groups when the principal opts for the
reward. Specifically, endowments in Periods 1 and 3, periods without rewards, are identical in
the control and the two treatments groups: the principal as well as each of her four agents
receive 300 Taler.19 In Period 2, principals in the control group receive an endowment of
100 Taler and agents an endowment of 600 Taler each. This mirrors the expected payoffs
in the treatment groups when the principal opts for the reward scheme (unconditional gift
or tournament, depending on the treatment).20 This procedure ensures that any performance
differences between the treatments and the control goup are solely driven by the rewards and
not by other factors such as distributional concerns or income effects.21 Table 2 in the Appendix
provides an overview of the fixed and variable pay components for all periods, treatments, and
roles.
2.4 Hypotheses
Before we present our results, we briefly summarize the theoretical predictions for our
treatments.
Tournament treatment. According to standard economic theory, a tournament incentive should
19On top of their endowment, principals earn additional money from the performance of their agents.
20If the principal decided against the reward, the principal and her agents received 300 Taler each as fixed Period
2 endowments in both the Gift and Tournament treatments (identical to payments in Periods 1 and 3), while they
earned 100 and 600 Taler in the control group, respectively. Therefore, we cannot assess responses to negative
reward decisions in an experimentally clean way.
21See, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on inequality aversion. Our set up also disentangles pure intention-based
reciprocity from other distributional concerns (Charness, 2004) by allocating the same payoffs to subjects in the
treatment groups (with positive reward decisions) and the control group in Period 2. The only difference that
remains is that control group payoffs were exogenously imposed by the experimenter, while treatment payoffs
were chosen by experimental subjects, the principals.
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increase average effort and performance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
Since economic theory tends to abstract from the type of task, this should be true in both the
creative and the routine task. Theories on crowding-out, on the other hand, suggest that intrinsic
motivation might be impaired by the reward (e.g., Deci, 1972; Lepper et al., 1973; Deci et al.,
1999). This holds in particular for the creative task that is more intrinsically motivating. When
crowding out is strong, the reduction in intrinsic motivation would outweigh the incentive effect
and Period 2 performance would fall. Otherwise, there would be a positive response to the
tournament incentive in Period 2, and a reduction in intrinsic motivation – if permanent – can
be detected in Period 3, where the tournament reward is no longer at stake (Frey and Jegen,
2001; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012).22
Gift treatment. Established theories on reciprocity predict that agents reciprocate principals’
gifts with increased effort (Akerlof, 1982; Levine, 1998; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004;
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Thus, we expect a positive performance response to the gift in
both tasks. Depending on how sustainable these responses are, this effect might carry over to
Period 3.23
2.5 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratories at the universities of Frankfurt,
Mannheim, and Heidelberg, Germany. Participants were recruited via the Online Recruitment
System ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 1999).
All interactions within the experiment were anonymous and communication was not allowed.
Subjects were seated randomly at a computer workstation upon arrival and were provided with
hard copy instructions that detailed the random matching of groups and roles (“employer” or
“employee”), the basic structure of the experiment, the task (routine or creative), and the scoring
procedures. A translation of the original instructions can be found in the Appendix. A few
pieces of information, such as fixed wages in Periods 2 and 3 as well as the availability of
rewards and reward decisions, were presented on the computer screen during the experiment.
Before the experiment started, subjects had to complete a series of questions about how their
actions would determine their own and their principal’s payoffs to ensure that they understood
the instructions.
22Unlike other models of crowding out, in Benabou and Tirole’s (2006) model, crowding out only persists as
long as the incentives are in place. Crowding out that is temporary and tied to the presence of incentives cannot
be directly identified in our design. Most discussions of crowding out (e.g. in the education literature) focus on
the permanent crowding out as a consequence of temporary incentives. It is that phenomenon that we attempt to
capture in this paper.
23Theoretically, agents could also reciprocate the investment in the tournament. We will address this point in
the results section.
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At the end of the experiment, subjects’ payoffs in the experimental currency unit “Taler” were
converted into Euros at an exchange rate of 100 Taler = 1 Euro. Subjects were paid in private.
Sessions (including instructions, the experiment, and questionnaires) lasted about 75 minutes
and subjects earned 15 Euros on average.
3 Main Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Methods
Table 3 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics split up by treatment and task.
Although we don’t discuss supplementary treatments until later, for completeness they are
included in the balance table. Overall, our sample contains 1123 subjects: 224 employers
and 899 employees.24 As we are interested in assessing how rewards affect performance, we
ran sessions until each treatment included roughly 60 agents with a positive reward decision.25
Overall, we observe 116 rewarded employees and 60 control group employees working on
the slider task and 116 rewarded employees and 56 control group employees working on the
creative task in our main treatments. We also have data for 364 additional agents with positive
reward decisions in supplementary treatments that we describe further below. The treatments
are largely balanced with regard to the location of the experiment, gender, age, and field of
study, albeit some differences are statistically significant. As we will show in our main analyses,
controlling for these characteristics does not alter the results.
The last row of Table 3 displays means and standard deviations of the baseline performance
in Period 1 across treatments and tasks. Baseline performance provides a measure of agents’
motivation to work on the task in the absence of rewards and comprises agents’ ability, intrinsic
motivation for the task, as well as their desire to benefit the principal. Mean performance
varies between 16.6 and 22 in the slider task, where performance is measured by the number
of correctly positioned sliders within each three minute work period. In the creative task,
average performance varies between 16 and 18. Performance here represents a subject’s score
in the creative task (see Section 2 for details on the scoring procedure). Apart from the
Tournament treatment in the slider task, there are no statistically significant differences between
the treatments and the respective control groups in either task. In the former, individuals’
performance is slightly better in Period 1 than that of subject in the control group (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p<0.05). To account for these initial performance differences, we control for
24We had to exclude 9 employees from the analysis due to an insufficient knowledge of the German language.
25Principals did not receive any information on agents’ performance in period 1 and agents knew this. Thus,
as expected, our data does not reveal a significant relationship between reward implementation and baseline
performance. We will report statistics on principals’ decisions regarding reward implementation as well as agents’
behavior in case of reward denial further below.
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baseline performance in the analyses that follow and use the change in performance between
Periods 1 and 2 as the outcome variable.
Figure 2 displays the change in raw performance from Period 1 to Period 2 by treatment and
task. The figure shows that performance in the slider task increases across both treatment groups
between these two rounds. The performance increase is particularly strong in the Tournament
treatment, but is also clearly detectible in the Gift treatment. The moderate performance
increase in the control group is probably a consequence of either learning or a response to
the higher fixed wage in period 2.26 The pattern is somewhat different in the creative task where
only agents in the Tournament treatment improve their performance between Periods 1 and 2.
There are no notable changes in mean performance in either the Gift treatment or the Control
group.
Thus, the raw data suggest that performance increases in the creative as well as in the simple
task in response to the tournament. However, only employees in the simple task seem to respond
to the gift. Below, we will corroborate these findings with more detailed analyses.
3.2 Further Analyses
In the analyses that follow, we compare the change in performance of individuals in the
treatment groups with that of individuals in the respective control group. We make performance
comparable between the different periods (and thus different items on the creative task) and
the two different tasks by standardizing performance.27 Further, we address potential mean
reversion by controlling for baseline performance. This also allows us to exploit the panel
structure of our experiment.
In order to assess the effect of the different rewards on performance in period 2, we fit the
following regression model using ordinary least squares (OLS):
Std. Performance Period 2i = β0 + β1 Std. Performance Period 1i
+ β2 Std. Performance Period 1i × 1 Slider-Task i
+ β3 Gifti + β4 Gifti × 1 Slider-Task i
+ β5 Tournamenti + β6 Tournamenti × 1 Slider-Task i
+ γXi + i.
(1)
26The higher fixed wage mirrors the wage of agents in groups with a positive reward decision by the principal
(at least in expectation). This allows us to disentangle reward effects from endowment effects. This is of particular
interest for the Gift treatment as it disentangles reciprocity from the response to the wage increase per se (Charness,
2004).
27We use the standard approach of subtracting the mean performance of the control group (in the respective
working period and task) and dividing the resulting difference by the standard deviation of the control group in the
respective task. Therefore, the standardized performance of the control group has a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. Treatment dummies (and additional controls) remain non-standardized to ease interpretation.
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Standardized Period 2 performance of individual i is the dependent variable. It is regressed on
i’s baseline performance in Period 1 as well as on the treatment dummies, and, in the most
comprehensive model, a set of person-specific control variables (Xi). Treatment dummies
as well as baseline performance are interacted with a dummy that indicates the type of task
(here: the simple task). This allows the treatment effects as well as the impact of baseline
performance to differ between the creative and the simple task. The creative task control group
serves as the reference category. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity
in all regressions.28 Column I presents the most parsimonious specification and does not
control for baseline performance. Column II of Table 4 shows the results for equation 1.
Column III adds additional control variables including age, age squared, sex, field of study,
time period (semester, exam period, semester break), and location. Adding these controls does
not alter the results.29 Similarly, the results are robust to the exclusion of baseline performance
as a control (see Column I of Table 4). When discussing the results below we refer to the
specification in Column III which includes all control variables. Column IV reports the results
of a supplementary treatment that will be discussed below (Section 4.1).
As was predicted by standard agency theory, the Tournament treatment has a large and
statistically significant positive effect on performance in both tasks. This effect is substantially
larger than that of the Gift treatment (Wald test, p<0.01 for both tasks). This suggests that
creative performance is responsive to incentives and that tournaments have the power to
substantially increase creative output. Interestingly, the Tournament effect is very similar in
both tasks: Agents increase their performance by approximately 0.7 standard deviations as
compared to the control group in both the creative and the simple task. This is first evidence
against crowding out as crowding out would have implied a smaller performance increase
(if not a performance decrease) in the intrinsically motivating creative task. The analysis of
performance in Period 3 below will further corroborate this finding.30
While the Tournament worked well in stimulating creative performance, the Gift did not. The
simple task shows that this absence of reciprocity is not driven by the gift being too small
or too unimportant to have any effect. In the simple task the Gift induced an economically
and statistically significant effect (p<0.05). The effect size of 0.2 standard deviations is small
relative to that of the tournament, but well in line with what other studies on reciprocity have
28The results are robust to using cluster-robust standard errors (by session) that control for potential intra-session
correlation.
29The regressions in Columns III and IV also include observations from a supplementary feedback treatment,
discussed below, that was run concurrently with the main treatments. We include observations from this treatment
in order to estimate the coefficients of the other control variables, introduced in column III, with greater precision.
We also ran more comprehensive specifications with further control variables, such as the Big Five and incentivized
risk and reciprocity measures, but their inclusion does neither improve the fit of the model nor does it affect the
results.
30Also, responses to the tournament do not differ between agents with above- and below-average baseline
performance. Results available upon request.
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found.31 The absence of reciprocity in the creative task is surprising and suggests that the
responsiveness to rewards differs between simple and creative tasks, at least with respect to
gifts. Below we will look further into this asymmetry in an effort to uncover the mechanism
behind these findings.32
Performance in the creative task is multi-dimensional, and an obvious concern is that the
observed performance increase is caused by subjects increasing the quantity of ideas at the
expense of their originality – a pattern that might not generally be desirable. The slider task
is different in this respect as it is one-dimensional, and an overall performance increase is
unambiguously positive for the principal. The Unusual Uses task allows us to look into this
issue. In the Unusual Uses task, creativity is scored along three dimensions: 1) the number
of valid uses (validity), a measure of quantity, 2) the number of categories into which answers
fall (flexibility), and 3) the originality of ideas (statistical infrequency of a response). The main
analysis above used a aggregate measure of these three dimensions as the dependent variable.
Table 5 shows the results split up by these different dimensions. Interestingly, the pattern of
results that we discussed for the overall score in our main analyses is reflected in all three
dimensions of creativity. Most noteworthy, there is no evidence that the strong performance
increase in the Tournament treatment comes at the expense of the originality of the answers.
To the contrary, the share of originality points out of the total number of points – referred to as
“originality rate” in the table – is even slightly higher in the Tournament treatment. That is, the
increased originality rate suggests that the number of original uses increases more than the total
number of uses.33
It is also insightful to look at the principals’ reward decisions. Three quarters of the principals
in the Tournament treatment invested in instituting the tournament. This is true in both the
simple and the creative task. In the Gift treatment, by comparison, three quarters of the slider
31We find no evidence for gender differences in either the Tournament or the Gift treatment.
We can also look at the use of the time-out button to examine whether the effects in the Tournament and the Gift
treatment are driven by a reduction in the number of breaks or by a performance improvement during actual work
time (results available upon request). In both tasks, the Tournament effect remains positive and significant (albeit
much smaller) after controlling for the number of breaks. In contrast, the performance increase in response to the
Gift in the slider task seems to be solely driven by a reduction in breaks and, hence, by an extension of actual
working time.
32Performance effects in response to the tournament are equal between the creative task, in which there is no
reciprocity, and the simple task in which there is reciprocity. This suggests that reciprocity should not play a big
role for explaining the performance increase in response to the tournament.
33One might be concerned that statistical infrequency does not accurately reflect what is commonly understood
as an “orignal” idea. Therefore we checked the robustness of our results on originality using subjective originality
ratings. Towards that end, we asked five research assistants unfamiliar with the experiment and blind to the
treatments to evaluate the originality of each answer. The evaluators were instructed to assign one point to answers
that they perceived as original, two points to answers that they perceived as very original, and zero points otherwise.
Using the score from this subjective originality assessment as the dependent variable does not alter the results:
originality increases under the Tournament incentive and does not increase in response to the Gift treatment. These
results are available from the authors upon request.
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task principals opted for the gift, but only approximately half of the creative task principals
did so. This is suggests that at least some of the principals might have anticipated that the gift
would not work well in the creative task.34 We also asked principals to provide reasons for why
they did or did not choose to implement the reward.35 In both tasks the main driver for the
reward decision was profit maximization, i.e. an expectation that subjects would or would not
respond favorably to the treatment. Hence, the larger share of principals who opted for the gift
in the slider task did so because they expected that this would raise their profits, and the share
of principals who opted against the gift in the creative task did so because they did not think
that the gift would pay off.
Another piece of evidence documenting the lack of reciprocity in the creative task stems
from the behavior of agents when the principal refused to implement the reward. These
results have to be interpreted with care as 1) the numbers of observations are low, and 2) the
fixed payments in the control group were designed to be equal to (expected) payments under
positive, but not negative reward decisions. Hence, treatment and control groups are not payoff
equivalent in cases of negative bonus decisions.36 In total, 116 agents were affected by negative
reward decisions. Figure 3 shows the results. The solid bars represent agents’ performance
responses (as compared to the control group) to positive reward decisions. These effect sizes
correspond to the main regression results discussed above. Hatched bars represent agents’
performance response to the announcement that the principal had not invested in additional
rewards. Interestingly, the announcement that there would be no tournament has no effect on
agents’ performance in either task. Hence, performance responses to tournaments are similar in
creative and simple tasks for both positive and negative reward decisions. Again, an asymmetry
between the two tasks emerges when looking at the Gift treatment. While agents substantially
reduce their performance in response to a negative Gift decision in the slider task, they remain
unaffected in the creative task. Hence, neither positive nor negative reciprocity is at play in
the creative task, while both are active in the slider task. In the slider task the response to a
negative reward decision is substantially larger than the response to a positive reward decision.
This is in line with other evidence showing that negative reciprocity tends to be stronger than
positive reciprocity (Kube et al., 2013). Most noteworthy for our purpose is that the absence of
reciprocity in the creative task holds not only for positive but also for negative reward decisions.
Overall our results suggest that tournaments effectively boost performance in both the simple,
34There is no evidence for intra-session-correlation regarding the reward implementation. Results upon request.
35Principals could mark whether they opted in favor of the reward 1) to maximize own profits, 2) to be nice to
the agents, 3) to maximize the total payoff of all participants in their group, (4) to reward good performance (in
case of the Tournament), or 5) other reasons. If the principal denied the reward, they could indicate whether they
1) thought that the rewards were not profitable for their own payoff, 2) did not want to provide extra earnings to
the agents, 3) did not want agents to earn more than themselves, or 4) other reasons.
36Principals and agents earn a fixed wage of 300 Taler in Period 2 when the principal decides against giving a
reward, whereas they are endowed with 100 Taler and 600 Taler, respectively, in the control group.
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routine task as well as in the creative task. There is no evidence for motivational crowding out
in the creative task. This is good news for firms, as it suggests that creativity can effectively
be raised with financial rewards. In contrast, financial gifts work well only in the routine task.
Here agents reciprocate the gift in an order of magnitude similar to that found in other studies
on reciprocity. There is no reciprocal response in the creative task. The absence of reciprocity in
the creative task holds for both positive and negative reward decisions. Principals seem to have
anticipated the lack of response because a substantially smaller fraction of employers instituted
the gift in the creative task. This finding has important implications for firms as creative tasks
tend to occur in settings where contracts are incomplete – that is, precisely in settings in which
organizations might want to exploit reciprocal inclinations in an attempt to elicit additional
effort. In the following section, we therefore further explore the absence of reciprocity in the
creative task in an effort to uncover the underlying mechanism.
4 Supplementary Investigations
4.1 The Mechanism behind the Absence of Reciprocity in the Creative
Task
This section discusses potential mechanisms that can explain why agents do not reciprocate the
gift in the creative task but do so in the simple, routine task.
One possible explanation could be the availability of an “excuse for low performance” in the
creative task. Such an excuse could be available if effort were only weakly correlated with
performance in the creative task. If this were true, agents who are motivated to reciprocate by
image concerns (but who don’t have an innate desire to reciprocate) might put in less effort
in the creative task, hiding behind a story in which they tried hard to come up with ideas but
simply did not succeed. Such an excuse is not available in the simple task, by comparison,
where increased effort directly translates into more correctly positioned sliders and, in turn,
increased performance. While this explanation is plausible, there is recent evidence that shows
that reciprocal behavior is not affected by the availability of these kinds of “excuses” for not
performing well (van der Weele et al., 2010).
A related explanation relies on the notion that the performance measure in the creative task is
less sensitive to agents’ increased effort than the one in the simple task. That is, reciprocity
might lead to effort increases in both tasks, but the effort increase might not translate into
significantly higher output in the creative task. The results of the Tournament treatment speak
against this explanation. In this treatment the financial stakes were identical across the two
tasks, and both tasks see a performance increase of similar magnitude. This suggests that the
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responsiveness of output to incentives is similar across the two tasks.
Finally, agents did not have perfect knowledge about how much surplus (in terms of the value
of their ideas) they generated for the principal in the creative task. Although the procedure
for evaluating ideas was detailed in the instructions, subjects could not perfectly predict the
exact number of points that they were generating for the principal. This is true because agents’
scores depended on the validity of answers as well as their originality (statistical infrequency).
Hence, even though subjects probably had a rough understanding of whether they provided
few or many answers and of whether their answers were off-the-chart creative or relatively
unoriginal, there was still some uncertainty with respect to the exact number of points generated
for the principal.37 In the simple task, by comparison, the value generated for the principal was
fully transparent, as subjects could easily assess how many sliders they positioned correctly. A
possible explanation therefore is that this difference in agents’ control over how much surplus
they generate for the principal drives the differences in reciprocal behavior between the two
tasks. Hennig-Schmitt et al. (2010) and Englmaier and Leider (2010) provide initial evidence
that this type of uncertainty can reduce agents’ reciprocal behavior. This mechanism should be
more relevant in the Gift treatment where agents presumably want to tailor their back transfer
to the perceived kindness of the gift, and should be less relevant in the Tournament treatment
where agents most likely trade-off the cost of effort with the perceived likelihood of winning,
which is independent of the profit they generate for the principal.
In order to investigate whether this mechanism explains the results, we ran two supplementary
treatments: Creative Transfer Control and Creative Transfer Gift. These treatments were
identical to the control group and the Gift treatment in the creative task apart from the following
aspects: First, at the end of each period, agents were told how many Taler they had generated
in the preceding round. Second, they could then decide how much of this surplus to transfer
to the principal. Hence, agents had perfect control over how much money would accrue to the
principal as a result of their work. Surplus that was not transferred was “lost” in the sense that
it did not benefit the principal (and agents’ payments were independent of their performance).
As in the Gift treatment, the principal had the option to provide a monetary gift of 300 Taler
to each of her agents before the start of Period 2 in the Creative Transfer Gift treatment. The
treatment Creative Transfer Control serves as an additional control group that allows us to
seperate out a change in the response to the gift from changes in behavior that are solely driven
by either the provision of feedback on the number of points earned or by the ability to choose
a transfer amount. Comparing behavior in Creative Transfer Gift with that in Creative Transfer
37Just like in our experiment, agents in a business context typically also have a rough sense of the value of
their ideas but cannot be sure about their precise implications for the bottom line: Ideas typically go through
various stages of evaluation, and there is often a relatively large time lag betweeen the creation of an idea and its
implementation. Finally, the value of an employee’s idea to the firm is frequently determined by the market, say
by the demand for a new product, which is also not perfectly known during the idea generation stage.
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Control therefore allows us to assess whether reciprocity emerges when agents have the power
to fine-tune their back transfers in the creative task.
Table 3 shows that baseline performance is very similar in Creative Transfer Control and
Creative Transfer Gift and slightly higher than average performance in the other treatments
utilizing the creative task.38 Only about two thirds of all subjects transfer the maximum amount
in Period 1. About 20% transfer less than half of the generated surplus while the remaining
subjects transfer intermediate amounts. In the following analysis, we will focus on transfers, as
transfers and not actual performance influence principals’ payoffs and thus signal reciprocity.
As in the main analysis, we control for baseline transfer – each agent’s transfer in Period 1 – in
all regressions.
The results are striking. Agents in the Creative Transfer Gift treatment transfer significantly
more of their surplus in Period 2 (after the gift) than in Period 1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p<0.01). They also transfer significantly more of their surplus in Period 2 than do agents in the
Creative Transfer Control group in the same period (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.05). Figure
4 depicts treatment effects for all Gift treatments. The bars show coefficients from separate
OLS regressions analyzing the effect of the Gift treatment on Period 2 effort (or, in the case
of the supplementary treatments, amount transferred), controlling for baseline performance
(transfer). The graph shows not only that subjects reciprocate the gift in the Creative Transfer
Gift treatment, but also that the order of magnitude of the effect is similar to the increase in
output in the Gift treatment in the simple task. Column IV of Table 4 reports the results from
the associated regressions. Again, one can see that reciprocity emerges in the Creative Transfer
Gift treatment and that the effect is similar to that in the simple, routine task.39
Taken together, the findings from these two additional treatments suggest that the lack of
reciprocity in the creative task was driven solely by agents’ inability to control and fine-tune
their impact on the principal’s bottom line. When agents have that control, they reciprocate the
wage gift in both tasks and the effect sizes are of similar magnitude. Such control is, however,
typically relatively low for creative tasks as well as for other complex problem solving tasks
that are prevalent in many white-collar jobs. In these settings information on the exact value of
effort (and ideas) to the principal is often not available. Thus, in practice this specific feature
38This may not be surprising as the transfer option allows agents to decouple their work from what accrues to
the principal. Therefore, agents who intrinsically enjoy working on the task but that are also inequality averse, can
work harder in these treatments without fearing that they create unduly large profits for the principal.
39Performance itself is not affected by the gift, which is not surprising given that many subjects had substantial
leeway in increasing transfers without increasing performance.
Just like in the main Gift treatment, we find no evidence for gender differences in response to the gift in the Creative
Transfer Gift treatment.
With respect to principals’ reward decisions, only 8 participants were affected by a negative reward decision
by the principal, making it impossible to reliably estimate this effect. The existing data, however, suggest that
negative reciprocity re-emerges in the Creative Transfer Gift treatment with a mean performance decrease of 0.82
in response to a negative gift decision, similar to what was observed in the slider task.
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inherent in creative tasks may hinder the emergence of reciprocity.
4.2 Analyses of Post-treatment Effects in Period 3
We now briefly turn to performance in Period 3 in order to assess whether the gift or the
tournament had any long-lasting effects on performance. The analysis of Period 3 is particularly
interesting for the Tournament treatment as any crowding out of intrinsic motivation might have
been dominated by the tournament’s incentive effect in Period 2 (see Bowles and Polania-Reyes,
2012 for a recent overview). Also, Period 3 performance can reveal whether winning or losing a
tournament has an independent effect on subsequent performance, as subjects in the Tournament
treatment learned at the end of Period 2 whether they did or did not belong to the best 50%
(winners/losers) in Period 2 and, hence, whether or not they won the tournament prize. Period
3 endowments were identical to those in Period 1 and subjects were aware that there would be
no further rewards or incentives.
Analogous to the analysis of the main treatment effects in Period 2 (see Equation 1), we assess
Period 3 performance by comparing the change in treatment group performance from Period 1,
with that of the control group.40 This allows us to account for effects associated with learning
and exhaustion. Table 6 shows the results.
For ease of interpretation, we separate the analyses by task. Columns I and II show the results
for the slider task, and columns III and IV depict the results for the creative task. In each case,
the first column (I and III) reports overall treatment effects. Interestingly, our main treatment
effects carry over to Period 3 even in the absence of further gifts or tournaments. The reciprocal
effect of the gift in the slider task is statistically significant and even slightly larger in Period 3
than in Period 2. Hence, reciprocity in the slider task has a persistent effect. The same pattern
holds in the Creative Transfer Gift treatment (see columns III and IV of Table 6). As was to be
expected, there is no evidence for reciprocity in Period 3 in the original Gift treatment (columns
III and IV).
In line with standard economic theory, performance in the Tournament treatment is lower in
Period 3 than in Period 2 due to the removal of the tournament incentive. It is noteworthy,
however, that Period 3 performance exceeds Period 1 performance. This suggests that the
Tournament has a sustainable performance-enhancing effect. Columns II and IV reveal that
the tournament winners drive this overall performance increase in Period 3. They work roughly
0.5 standard deviations harder than would-be winners in the control group. Interestingly, losing
a tournament does not affect subsequent behavior. Losers’ performance is either not statistically
significantly different from their baseline performance or is even a bit higher.
40The results are robust to including Period 2 performance, using fixed-effects linear panel models or
random-effects models.
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For real-world applications, it is important to understand the mechanism behind this positive
winner effect. One possible explanation is learning on the task. By definition, tournament
winners have worked more and harder on the task than have other participants. To the extent
that the tasks are subject to a steep learning curve, increased Period 2 effort and performance
could translate into increased Period 3 performance even if Period 3 effort was the same for
tournament winners and tournament losers. It is unlikely, however, that this effect is driven
solely by learning as performance in the control group increases only slightly between Periods 1
and 2 and is relatively similar in Periods 1 and 3 (see Figure 5). Alternative explanations are that
1) the positive feedback associated with winning a tournament could heighten self-confidence
and intrinsic motivation (Eisenberger and Shanock, 2003; Vansteenkiste and Deci, 2003), or
that 2) winning a tournament could put individuals in a positive mood, which would in turn
positively affect their performance.41 These two explanations differ with respect to whether
the positive effect from winning should raise subsequent performance only for the task at
hand (task-specific confidence or intrinsic motivation), or whether it should also spill over to a
different, unrelated task (general mood effect).
To shed light on this issue, we conducted two supplementary tournaments. In these
supplementary tournament treatments, subjects were asked to work on both the routine and
the creative task in alternating orders (either slider (Period 1) - creative (Period 2) - slider
(Period 3) (SCS) or creative (Period 1) - slider (Period 2) - creative (Period 3) (CSC). Identical
to the main Tournament treatments, agents received fixed wages in Periods 1 and 3, and the
principal could implement a tournament in Period 2. In total, 55 subjects participated in the
Slider-Creative-Slider (SCS) treatment, and 46 subjects in the Creative-Slider-Creative (CSC)
treatment. The right-hand columns of Table 3 show summary statistics for these observations.
There are no significant differences in baseline performance between these two supplementary
tournament treatments and the respective control groups. For this comparison, and for analyzing
treatment effects below, we use the creative task control group as a benchmark for baseline
performance and Period 3 performance in CSC, and the slider task control group to assess
performance in Periods 1 and 3 in SCS. Note that we did not include additional control groups
with varying tasks but without the tournament. We therefore cannot control for changes in
Period 3 performance that are caused by the change in the tasks per se, rendering our findings
below suggestive rather than conclusive. Table 7 presents the results on Period 3 performance.
The results are split up by treatment and task.
Columns I and II report results from the slider task (overall and split up by winners and losers).
Columns III and IV do the same for the creative task. Analogously, Period 3 treatment effects
on the the mixed tasks SCS and CSC are depicted in columns V-VIII. Each regression controls
41For a review of mood effects on performance see, for instance, Lane et al. (2005). Related to mood effects,
Kräkel (2008) discuss the notion that tournaments may induce a “joy of winning” which in turn affects subsequent
performance. DeJarnette (2015) proposes a theory of effort momentum, with similar predictions.
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for baseline performance and compares effects to the respective control group. We find no
evidence for positive spillover effects – neither overall nor for winners or losers separately. The
treatment effects in the mixed tasks treatments, SCS and CSC (Columns V-VIII) are positive
but small and statistically insignificant. Hence, winning a tournament or receiving positive
feedback may lead to higher subsequent performance, but we have suggestive evidence that
such an increase is limited to the task at hand. Possible mechanisms are increased task-specific
self-confidence or intrinsic motivation. Our data does not lend support for more general and
task-unspecific effects on intrinsic motivation, such as mood effects.
4.3 Looking into the Effectiveness of Tournaments
Tournaments affect behavior via two different channels: 1) a concern for a good relative
standing and 2) the monetary incentive (the tournament prize). For policy, it is important to
understand how much of the tournament effect is driven by the (costly) prize and how much
is driven by (cheap) relative performance information. To disentangle these two channels, we
conducted a Feedback treatment that conveyed the same information about relative rank than
the Tournament treatment but without monetary consequences.42
In the Feedback treatment, the principal had to decide before the start of Period 2 whether or not
relative rank information would be provided to her agents at the end of Period 2. The provision
of relative performance feedback was costless to the principal and payoffs in this treatment
were identical to those in the control group in all three rounds. When the principals opted for
feedback provision, agents were informed at the beginning of Period 2 that they would learn at
the end of Period 2 whether or not they belonged to the best 50% of their group. Hence, the
Feedback treatment mirrored the information structure in the Tournament treatment, but without
monetary consequences. We observe 56 agents with a positive feedback decision in the slider
task and 68 agents with a positive feedback decision in the creative task in this treatment.
Table 8 displays the coefficient estimates of the feedback treatment from our main regressions.
We find that Feedback increases performance by about 0.18 standard deviations in both tasks.
The coefficent estimates are marginally statistically significant in period 2. The effect sizes are
statistically significantly lower than those in the Tournament treatment in both tasks (Wald-tests,
p<0.00) and suggest that about one fourth of the increase in the Tournament treatment is driven
by a concern for a good relative standing while the remainder is driven by the desire to win the
tournament prize.
Effect sizes are of similar magnitude in period 3 but lose statistical significance. These overall
42There is a growing literature in economics that documents the impact of relative performance feedback on
behavior. So far, the evidence is mixed with respect to the direction (positive or negative) of the effect. Azmat
and Iriberri (2010) and Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011), for example, find that feedback increases performance,
whereas Barankay (2011) shows that performance rankings decrease performance.
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effects hide, however, that individuals who received positive relative performance feedback
perform significantly better than comparable others in the control group, mirroring our findings
for tournament winners in the Tournament treatment.43 Recipients of negative performance
feedback, however, are not demotivated (in both the Feedback as well as the Tournament
treatments). Their performance is not statistically significantly different from their baseline
performance.
Taken together, the findings from both the Tournament and Feedback treatments suggest that the
chance of receiving positive feedback enhances performance but that the effect is only strong
when performing well is also rewarded with a monetary prize. This holds for both tasks as well
as for ex ante incentive effects and for overall post-treatment performance.
5 Conclusion
This paper reports the results from a large-scale laboratory experiment that studies the impact
of both explicit incentives (tournaments) and implicit rewards (wage gifts) on creativity. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the impact of wage gifts on creativity.
We also have not come across another study that compares the effectiveness of wage gifts and
tournaments in one set-up, providing insights into the relative effect sizes of these two rewards
on both a creative and a simple task. The inclusion of the simple task allows us to benchmark
the effectiveness of the different rewards on creativity and to link our results on creativity to the
existing literature on tournament incentives and wage gifts that uses simple tasks.
We report two sets of interesting results. The first relates to the tournament incentive. Our
results suggest that a tournament prize for above-average performance has a substantial positive
incentive effect on creativity. The effect size is similar to that on performance in the simple
task. This indicates that incentives can influence creativity and that there is no crowding out
of intrinsic motivation.44 About one fourth of this effect seems to be driven by a concern for
relative rank, as is suggested by a supplementary treatment in which subjects work towards
receiving the same rank information as in the tournament but without financial consequences.
Thus, it is largely the monetary prize that is responsible for the positive incentive effect of
the tournament. Interestingly, the tournament does not only increase the quantity of ideas
submitted, but also their quality in terms of originality. Further, tournament winners continue
to outperform their own baseline performance and agents in the control group. A set of
supplementary treatments suggests that this is driven by an increase in task-specific motivation
43In fact, the coefficients on Tournament winner and Positive relative feedback are statistically indistinguishable
in both tasks (Wald-test creative task, 0.19; Wald-test simple task, p=0.25).
44Erat and Gneezy (2015) find evidence for choking under pressure in their creative task that is more “blue skye”
in nature.
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that does not spill over to other tasks. Losers of the tournament show no signs of demotivation
in both tasks. The effectiveness of tournaments is in line with the observation that creative
tasks are often organized in a tournament framework in the real world. For example, architects
on virtually all major projects are chosen via a winner-take-all competition. The same is true
on most innovation platforms such as innocentive.com that many companies now utilize for
creative input.
A second set of interesting results relates to the financial gift. We find an asymmetry in its
effectiveness between the two tasks. While the gift effectively triggers a reciprocal response
in the simple, routine task, there is no evidence for reciprocity in the creative task. This
suggests that the incentive response function differs between creative and simple tasks, despite
the similarity of responses in the Tournament treatment. Interestingly, this asymmetry holds for
both positive and negative reciprocity, and principals seem to have anticipated this asymmetry
as many more principals opted for the gift in the simple task than in the creative task. We
explore a set of explanations for this finding and, through the implementation of additional
treatments, can trace the effect back to agents’ lack of knowledge about how exactly their effort
translates into profit for the principal. While agents perfectly observe how much output they
produce in the simple task, there is some uncertainty in the creative task because the value of
their ideas to the principal depends, for example, on an originality rating. This is true for our
creative task, but also holds for creative and complex tasks more generally. One implication of
our finding therefore is that wage gifts might not boost performance in white-collar jobs that
involve complex tasks and creativity. This is important to note as creative and complex tasks
are typically governed by incomplete contracts that might have rendered gift exchange a viable
way of increasing effort. These results also speak to the ongoing debate about reciprocity in
the lab versus in the field (e.g., Kube et al., 2012 or Kessler, 2013) and suggest that one reason
for the observed absence of reciprocity in the field could be agents’ imperfect knowledge about
how their effort affects their principal’s profits.
But even if potential benefits from ideas were fully transparent, our study suggests that wage
gifts are less effective than tournaments in triggering agents’ performance in both tasks. While
the tournament was profitable for the principals that opted for it, the gift was not.45 In this
study, tournaments clearly emerge as preferable to wage gifts in terms of fostering creativity.
Nevertheless, tournaments do have well-understood downsides that should be considered before
implemention. For instance, tournaments have been shown to increase sabotage among workers
(for instance, Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011), to induce a self-selection of more risk-tolerant
agents (for instance, Eriksson et al., 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011), and to make low performers
45The payoff consequences of the Gift in comparison to the control group (difference in average effort per work
group minus costs of the gift) are -0.27 Euro in the slider task, -1.82 Euro in the creative Gift treatment and -0.29
Euro in the treatment Creative Transfer Gift. In the Tournament, principals’ payoff increased by 1.39 Euro in the
slider and 1.45 Euro in the creative task.
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more likely to give up early in the contest (for instance, Berger et al., 2013).
The present study calls for future work that addresses whether the positive tournament effect
that we find, also holds for contests with high-stakes. Previous studies indicate that high stakes
cause choking under pressure and, hence, a non-linear relationship between reward size and
effort, and that this is particularly true for cognitively challenging tasks (Ariely et al., 2009;
Bracha and Fershtman, 2012). Further, creative tasks come in many different forms. Charness
and Grieco (2012) show that responses to incentives might differ between tasks that have a
clearly delineated solution and tasks that are open and require pure out-of-the-box thinking. In
our opinion, our task serves as a good proxy for everyday idea generation in firms. However,
organizations also rely on other types of creative input that our task could not capture, such as
idea implementation or breakthrough innovations. Future work needs to test the robustness of
our findings for other kinds of complex and creative tasks.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Screenshot of the Slider Task
Note: The figure presents a screenshot of the slider task. The screen displays the
remaining time and the number of correctly positioned sliders. The time-out button is
displayed at the bottom of the screen.
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Note: The bars show the difference in mean performance between Period 2 and Period 1. The whiskers
depict 90% confidence intervals of paired t-tests.
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Figure 3: Effect Sizes for Positive and Negative Reward Decisions by the Principal
Note: The dependent variable is standardized performance of agents in Period 2. The bars
show the estimated regression coefficients of separate OLS regressions. Performance is
measured as the number of correctly positioned sliders in the simple task and as the score
achieved in the creative task. The regressions control for baseline performance in Period 1.
The respective control group (slider or creative) serves as the reference category. Statistical
significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Gift Slider Gift Creative Gift Creative Transfer
 
90% Confidence Interval
Note: The bars show the estimated regression coefficients of separate OLS
regressions. Standardized performance (transfer) in Period 2 is the dependent variable.
Performance is measured as the number of correctly positioned sliders in the simple
task, as the score achieved in the creative task, and as the amount tranferred in the
creative transfer treatments. The regression controls for baseline performance in
Period 1. The respective control group serves as the reference category.
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Note: The bars show the difference in mean performance between Period 3 and Period 1. The whiskers
depict 90% confidence intervals of paired t-tests. Note, this figure is on a bigger scale than Figure 2 to
improve readability.
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Table 1: Examples of Answers and Categories for the Unusual Uses Task by Item
Paper Tin can Cord
Frequent Paper airplane Pen container Shoestrings
Answers Paper hat Tin can phone Dog leash
Toilet paper Ball Fishing line
Frequent Toys Non-food container Clothing accessories
Categories Clothing Communication Leashes
Hygiene/Cleaning Sport devices Fishing
Original Lampshade Bedframe Pulley
Answers Filter Animal house Rope bridge
Game of cards Insect trap Bowstring
Very original Sound amplifier Scarecrow Trap (to play a trick)
Answers Pin wheel Shower head Straightening of acreages
Artificial snow (for decoration) Treasure chest To cut a cake
Invalid Pencil Computer Glasses
Answers Television Window Electric conductor




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Treatment Effects in Period 2
I II III IV
Gift Treatment -0.019 0.026 -0.000 0.019
(0.143) (0.099) (0.101) (0.100)
Gift x Slider-Task 0.375** 0.209* 0.195* 0.178*
(0.170) (0.109) (0.107) (0.107)
Tournament Treatment 0.795*** 0.736*** 0.735*** 0.731***
(0.173) (0.143) (0.142) (0.142)
Tournament x Slider-Task 0.166 -0.058 -0.063 -0.064
(0.178) (0.166) (0.167) (0.167)
Creative Transfer Treatment 0.087
(0.105)
Creative Transfer x Gift 0.249**
(0.115)
Baseline 0.657*** 0.631*** 0.656***
(0.076) (0.062) (0.046)
Baseline x Slider-Task 0.002 0.100 0.071
(0.094) (0.079) (0.066)
Intercept -0.000 -0.000 0.589 0.187
(0.093) (0.062) (0.496) (0.451)
Controls NO NO YES YES
Observations 348 348 472 611
R2 0.146 0.546 0.564 0.554
Note: This table reports the estimated OLS coefficients from Equation 1. The dependent
variable is the standardized performance in Period 2 and refers to the number of sliders
moved in the simple task, the creativity score in the creative task, and the amount transferred
in the Creative Transfer treatments. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The estimation includes data from agents in groups with a positive reward
decision by the principal. Additional control variables are age, age squared, sex, location,
field of study as well as a set of time fixed effects (semester period, semester break, exam
period) and observations from and controls for a supplementary feedback treatment that was
run concurrently (Section 4.3 and Table 8 describe the treatment and the results). The latter
are included to increase the precision with which we can estimate the control variables.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
40
Table 5: Dimensions of Creativity: Treatment Effects on Standardized Performance in Period 2
Creative Task
Score Validity Flexibility Originality Originality Rate
I II III IV V
Gift -.0220 0.005 0.002 -0.101 -0.0180
(0.120) (0.126) (0.115) (0.144) (0.023)
Tournament 0.746*** 0.805*** 0.601*** 0.719*** 0.045**
(0.161) (0.169) (0.148) (0.181) (0.021)
Period 1 0.615*** 0.598*** 0.613*** 0.523*** 0.173**
(0.061) (0.062) (0.056) (0.071) (0.071)
Intercept 1.908 1.620 1.233 3.168 0.293
(2.029) (1.917) (1.685) (2.72) (0.395)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 240 240 240 240 215
R2 0.484 0.470 0.515 0.346 0.109
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of Equation 1, where we regress standardized
performance in Period 2 on baseline performance and treatment dummies. Column I reports
results on the aggregated creativity score. Columns II to IV report the results on the different
sub-dimensions of the creativity score. Column V displays treatment effects on the originality
rate. The originality rate equals achieved originality points divided by the total number of
points for a subject’s answers (subjects with zero points were dropped in this column). The
estimation includes data from agents in groups with a positive reward decision by the principal.
Additional control variables are age, age squared, sex, location, field of study as well as a set
of time fixed effects (semester period, semester break, exam period) and observations from a
supplementary feedback treatment (with separate treatment dummies, see Section 4.3 and Table
8). The latter are included to increase the precision with which we can estimate the control
variables. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels
are denoted as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Treatment Effects in Period 3
Slider Creative
I II III IV
Gift 0.259** 0.268** 0.033 0.031
(0.110) (0.110) (0.113) (0.114)
Tournament 0.223 0.365***
(0.153) (0.126)
Creative Transfer -0.038 -0.035
(0.122) (0.122)
Creative Transfer x Gift 0.366*** 0.362***
(0.110) (0.110)
Tournament Winner 0.503*** 0.493***
(0.189) (0.159)
Tournament Loser -0.018 0.242*
(0.159) (0.140)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Baseline YES YES YES YES
Intercept YES YES YES YES
N 232 232 379 379
R2 0.712 0.728 0.540 0.548
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of standardized performances in Period 3 analogous
to Equation 1. Performance is measured as the number of correctly positioned sliders,
as the score achieved in the creativity task, and as the amount transferred in the Creative
Transfer treatments. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The estimation includes data from agents in groups with a positive reward decision by the
principal and observations from a supplementary feedback treatment (see Section 4.3). The
latter are included to increase the precision with which we can estimate the control variables.
Additional control variables are age, age squared, sex, location, field of study as well as a
set of time fixed effects (semester period, semester break, exam period). Significance levels













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Period 2 and Period 3 Effects of the Feedback Treatment
Slider-Task Creative-Task
Feedback 0.184* 0.182*
Period 2 (0.108) (0.102)
Feedback 0.118 0.171
Period 3 (0.132) (0.129)
Positive Relative 0.303 0.319**
Feedback Period 3 (0.196) (0.148)
Negative Relative -0.028 0.035
Feedback Period 3 (0.135) (0.144)
Controls YES YES
Note: This table reports the estimated OLS coefficient estimates for the Feedback Treatment
for Periods 2 and 3. Period 3 effects are split up by the whether person learned that they did
or did not belong to the 50% top performers. Feedback effects for Period 2 are regression
coefficients from specification IV in Table 4 while post-treatment effects for Period 3 are
from Table 6. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Control
variables include observations from the Gift treatment, the Tournament treatment, and the
Control group. Additionally, we control for age, age squared, sex, location, field of study
as well as a set of time fixed effects (semester period, semester break, exam period). The
Control group serves as the reference category. Significance levels are denoted as follows:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Appendix
Translated Instructions (Original in German)
General Instructions
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. Keep in
mind that communication among participants is prohibited during the experiment. Please turn
off your mobile phone and other electronic devices for the entire duration of the experiment.
During the experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn money in the form of Taler. How
many Taler you will earn depends on a random draw as well as on your decisions and the
decisions of other participants. All Taler that you earn in the experiment will be converted to
Euros at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is
100 Taler = 1 Euro
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At the end of the experiment you will receive the amount of money that you have earned
during the experiment in cash. Your earnings will be rounded up to full 10-cent amounts. We
would like to point out that your name is only required for the settlement of payments at the
end of the experiment. Your name will not be connected to any decisions you make during the
experiment. Your actions are completely anonymous.
Assignment of roles
At the beginning of the experiment a computer will randomly assign you the role of an
“employer” or an “employee”. You will keep this role for the entire experiment. Further, you
will be randomly assigned to groups of 5 participants. One employer and four employees form
one group. The groups will remain the same for the entire experiment.
Structure of the experiment
The experiment consists of two parts. Part 1 is the actual experiment. Employees only interact
with their employer in Part 1. Part 2 consists of a series of further decision tasks. Only
employees will be active in Part 2. The instructions for Part 2 of the experiment will be shown
on your computer screen once Part 1 is finished. After to Parts 1 and 2, both employees and




Part 1 of the experiment will be carried out in three rounds. In the first round employers and
employees will receive a fixed payment of 300 Taler. The amount of the fixed payment for the
second and third round will be displayed on the computer screen shortly before the respective
round starts.
Variable payment
Employers earn additional money. How much they earn is determined by the work performance
of the four employees in her group.46 Towards that end, employees are asked to work on a
simple task in each round. The task will be the same in every round. Employers’ additional
earnings depend on the overall performance of her four employees in all three rounds. The
employer will not receive any information on agents’ performance or her own earnings until the
very end of the experiment. Employees are free to decide how much effort they want to exert
and thereby how much money they want to earn for their employer. Employees’ own earnings
will not be influenced by their work performance. Employees do, however, have the option
to press a time-out button while they work on the task. This button will lock the screen for
20 seconds so that they cannot work on the task during that time period. Employees receive
5 Taler for each time that they press the time-out button. The button can no longer be pressed
when there are less than 20 seconds left in a round. Employers are also allowed to work on the
task in all three rounds. Their performance, however, will neither influence their own payment
nor their employees’ payments. The employer can also press the time-out button. Pressing the
button, however, does not translate into extra income for the employer. The employer cannot
earn additional Taler during time-out.
[The original instructions had the description of the creative or the simple, routine task at this
point.]
The employer will not receive any information related to how many points each of her agents
generated. Her total payoff will only be revealed at the end of the experiment. Employees will
also not be informed about the total amount of Taler generated by themselves or other group
members. All participants will be called individually for payment. Please remain in your seat
at the end of the experiment until your seat number has been called.
[Further instructions, depending on the treatment were displayed on the computer screen.]
46For simplicity we use the feminine (she, her) to describe employers, but this does, of course, refer to both
sexes and employers will be both male and female.
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Task description: Creative task
As described above, the first part of the experiment consists of three rounds. In each round,
participants will work on a task that requires creativity.
Example of the task
Please list as many, as different and as unusual uses for a rubber tire as you can think of. Do
not restrict yourself to a specific size of a tire. You can also list uses that require several tires.
Do not restrict yourself to uses you are familiar with, but think of as many new uses as possible!
You will receive the same task in each round with varying objects. You will have three minutes
per round. There will be a break of a few minutes after every round.
Evaluation of the task
The employer receives 5 Taler per valid answer. Answers are “valid” when they are practicable
and when their realization is at least vaguely conceivable. Please describe the possible use in a
few words if necessary (Using the example of the rubber tire: “sled” or “flower box” are clear
answers, whereas “target” would require further explanation such as “ball game with tire as
target”.).
For original (rare) answers, the employer receives 5 extra Taler. For very original (very rare)
answers, the employer receives 10 extra Taler. An answer is considered (very) “original” if only
(very) few people think of it. To this end, the answers are compared to a catalog of answers that
is based on the answers of more than 100 test persons.
Furthermore, answers will be assigned to different answer categories. The employer receives
5 extra Taler for each category answers fall into. Using the example of the rubber tire: “car
tire” and “bicycle tire” belong to the category “tires as wheels” and result in 5 extra Taler. The
answer “swing seat” is a different category (category “toys”) and yields an additional 5 Taler.
At the end of the experiment, we will ask you to fill out a brief questionnaire while we evaluate
the answers of all employees. We will calculate the employer’s variable payment from the total
score of all four employees over the three rounds.
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Task description: Simple, routine task
In every round you will work on a task that requires you to use your mouse to move “sliders”
on the computer screen. You will see 48 sliders on your screen in each round. These sliders
have to be moved to position 50. Each slider starts at position 0 and can be moved anywhere
up to position 100. The number displayed to the right of each slider indicates the slider’s
current position. You can adjust the slider as often as you like. Your working time is set to
3 minutes (180 seconds) per round. If you have moved all 48 sliders to the correct position
before the end of a round, you will automatically be directed to a new screen with 48 additional
sliders. Thus, you can move a maximum of 96 sliders to the correct position during the
180 seconds of each round. During each round, you will see some information at the top
of your screen. You will see the round number, the remaining time for the current round,
and the number of sliders that you have moved to position 50 in the current round so far.
Before the first round starts, you will be able to test the task for 60 seconds. Your performance in
the test round will not affect your own or your employer’s payoff. The employer will receive 5
Taler for each slider that you correctly position in the three rounds. At the end of the experiment,
the number of correctly positioned sliders of all four employees of a group across all three
rounds are summed up to calculate the variable payment of the employer.
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